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20 January 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Intelligence)

The DCI has directed that briefings on Soviet missile strength, Soviet economy and related subjects prepared for his or my use before Congressional committees, or other such high-level bodies, include a statement as appropriate at the outset along the following lines:

We have a high degree of confidence in our estimates because they come from intelligence from a variety of sources, [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] Satellite photography has been reasonably successful and we consider it essential for the security of the Free World.

25X1

/s/  
Marshall S. Carter  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Acting Director

cc:

Executive Director *cy 4*  
General Counsel *5*  
DD/STT-*cy 6*  
Director of Security-*cy 7*

Additional Distribution:

DD/DCI (Mr. Elder)-*cy 8*  
CR-*cy 3*  
DDCI-*cy 9*  
*Copy 12 - DSI/V*

[redacted]  
Copy 9

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*N. Knoche: MSC: 4cc*

NSC review(s) completed.

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20 January 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Intelligence)

*on Soviet missile strength, Soviet economy and related subjects*

The DCI has directed that briefings prepared for his or my use before Congressional committees, or other such high-level bodies, include a statement at the outset along the following lines:

*as appropriate*

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25X1

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25X1

Marshall S. Carter  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Acting Director

cc:

Executive Director  
General Counsel  
DD/S&T  
Director of Security  
Additional Distribution:  
O/DCI (Mr. Elder)  
ER  
DDCI

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# /

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

January 17, 1964

Note to General Carter

When giving briefing at White House include  
following statement:

We have a high degree of confidence in ~~the~~ *our* estimates because they come from intelligence from a variety of sources. [redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted] which has been reasonably successful and we consider essential for the security of the Free World.

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JAM

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Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001400010012-5

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Noted by DCI 25X1  
on 1 Feb 1964

18 January 1964

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Disarmament Meeting on 18 January 1964  
at the White House

1. At 2:45 this date Mr. Alexis Johnson informed me that there would be a meeting with the President at 3:15 p.m., in the White House to discuss the most recent revision of his proposed statement to the Geneva Conference, and that I was expected to be there. Upon arriving at the meeting place I was handed a draft by Adrian Fisher. It subsequently developed that McNamara, Rusk, Taylor, and the President must have had this draft for at least long enough to have thoroughly reviewed and considered it. In any event, I read it immediately and was struck by the fact that in those areas of the original draft as given to Mr. McCone by Dr. Scoville in which the DCI had taken exception, ameliorating language had been inserted in the new draft to considerably temper and meet objections of Mr. McCone. The draft was now much more a speech by the President as to what he hoped might develop as a result of mutual give and take rather than a statement of U. S. policy and definite intentions.

2. The President entered the room shortly, accompanied by Bill Moyer and Jack Valenti. Others present were Rusk, McNamara, General Taylor, Dr. Seaborg, Adrian Fisher, and myself. Alexis Johnson was not present.


3. The President opened by stating that he had read the revised draft and wanted to know if there were any objections to it. Dr. Seaborg pointed out that he had some hesitancy about opening totally his closed-down plants for international inspection (paragraph 3, page 3) but that there were many ways of determining whether or not the reactor was in fact shut down -- he simply did not want to give carte blanche to inspectors overrunning the entire plant. This position was adopted. Dr. Seaborg then

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


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said that he wanted it understood that the closing down of the plants was not necessarily a permanent commitment and that whenever it became necessary or desirable, in the absence of international agreement to the contrary, we should retain complete freedom of action to reopen a reactor any time we chose. This position was agreed.

4. Mr. McNamara pointed out that he had been working steadily the last few days to get agreement in the Pentagon on a paper substantially in accord with this draft and that the only thing that now gave them a problem was subparagraph (c) on page 4 as to the establishment of nuclear-free zones. He said if this could be deleted, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of Defense would buy the paper. Their concern was that we would get so involved in these zones that we would lose freedom of action to shift nuclear weapons through the Canal Zone, for example, or by air through overflights. Secretary Rusk pointed out that they had discussed this a number of times before, that it was nothing new, and that he would hope we could establish nuclear-free zones in Latin America and Africa for example. The President said that when the crunch came he depended on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and that he must have them on his side. Accordingly the paragraph on nuclear-free zones was eliminated.

5. I then stated that the President should know that there was on record a letter from Mr. McCone pointing out some problem areas that could develop in a number of these points, particularly as to our getting back into a position of letting up on the need for full and adequate verification. I further said that aside from the intelligence aspects of the problem, there were certain policy matters as regards reaction of West Germany, and particularly France, that should be considered. The President then asked for Mr. McCone's letter and glanced through it rather hurriedly. General Taylor asked to see the letter and he did the same. I then gave a copy to Secretary Rusk, particularly pointing out those portions of DCI's letter concerning his membership on the Committee of Principals and his reservations at the policy

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level. Mr. Rusk indicated he had seen Mr. McCone's letter. (Subsequently Mr. Adrian Fisher stated that they had worked all afternoon and most of the night in revising the original draft to meet the objections raised by the DCI and he thought that they had moderated their language and weasel-worded the statement adequately to meet DCI's objections.) The President then asked me if I had any specific, further objections to the statement now that the nuclear-free zone problem had been eliminated and that the DCI's letter was on record. I stated that depending upon what was actually finally determined as an international agreement, we might be in serious trouble on verification but that this problem would come later. I felt that as a statement by the President there was adequate protection in future negotiations to ensure the best interests of the United States. (I subsequently checked with Adrian Fisher who assured me that there was no backoff in ACDA and State from the requirement for adequate verification and that the additional words inserted in the latest draft were specifically to meet DCI's prior objections. In other words, DCI's letter of comment is a matter of record with the President and the other principals at the meeting, and the President commented that the Central Intelligence Agency was certainly a smooth-operating outfit. It was obvious that he had his tongue in his cheek in this regard to indicate that we not only covered our rear but our flanks as well.) The President then directed a number of actions as regards Congressional briefings, preparation of a talk for him to make to the American public in explanation of his Geneva Conference statement. In connection with this speech for American consumption, he directed that it be prepared so that any tenant farmer could understand it -- ten words per sentence, four sentences per paragraph, and four-letter words throughout.

6. This ended discussion of the Geneva Conference statement.

7. New subjects:

a. There was then a discussion of a letter to Khrushchev but I was not aware of the contents nor were the contents mentioned. The discussion revolved around the date at which such a letter would be made public.

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b. The President then expressed his great concern over the emergent situation in Panama. He said that he had proposed injecting himself directly into the problem yesterday with a public statement and approaches to the OAS specifically to lay down publicly exactly what the facts were as regards Panamanian aggression, intrusions into the Zone, killing of American soldiers with rifle bullets by snipers while they were armed only with bird shot, etc., etc. He said that he had been dissuaded from this course by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State and others. He said he was shocked to read in this morning's New York Times a story (presumably the Tad Szulc article) that pretty well covered exactly what his proposals were. He said he still felt it was a good idea and that he thought Harriman, Rusk, McNamara, Johnson, and others should assemble small groups of Latin American Ambassadors and tell them what he, the President, wanted to tell them. He thought it was an even better idea if he did it himself. I did not get the impression that a decision was made in this regard nor do I think any action will be taken as a result of this meeting. Unfortunately the discussion centered then on the security aspects of leaks to the public and the President expressed in no uncertain terms, with great persuasiveness and even more emphasis, his unhappiness at his complete inability to say anything to anyone without its immediately being in the papers or getting around town. He made some very pointed comments reflecting on the integrity of the State Department and of the Department of Defense in this regard. He felt the situation had become extremely serious in the past two months since he had become President and did not recall any such problem when he was meeting periodically with President Kennedy. He said he was prepared to clean house wherever necessary to overcome this. Secretary Rusk pointed out that this had been going on for twenty years and was nothing new and McNamara agreed. The President thought it was worse than he had ever seen it before and that in his 22 years on the Armed Services Committee and around the Hill he had never been involved in anything like this nor had he ever been

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
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bothered by reporters once he had made it clear that he was not the talking kind. No decisions were taken, no actions directed although both Rusk and McNamara indicated they would immediately take whatever steps were feasible to improve the situation.

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
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
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d. There was minor discussion as regards the situation in ~~North~~<sup>South</sup> Vietnam with no one indicating any great enthusiasm or any great surge of hopefulness as to the present situation. The President stated he was most unhappy to be making a speech indicating that things were improving and then to have a USIA spokesman and an Embassy spokesman state in Saigon that things were falling apart. He said somebody was getting poor advice as well as poor information and he was inclined to think it was he. He said that he was new in the job and that he had in the past several months based his actions on

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the advice and guidance he had received from his principal advisers whom he considered professionals and experts in their fields. He said he was beginning to have serious doubts that his own judgment had been wrong in a number of cases although he was the first to admit that he had been wrong in the past throughout his life at various times and was certainly no more immune than anyone else from making mistakes. I got the distinct impression that he was mighty unhappy with some of the actions he has taken as a result of recommendations from State. I also got the feeling that from here on out he is much more liable to use his own intuition and prescience as to what should be done and what should not be done in the daily operations of his actions in the foreign policy field.

e. Turning to more pleasant matters, the President noted that the dinner he had given for the Congressional Committee leadership had been a complete success and that he was going to repeat it again on the 23rd and the 30th. He had received nothing but highly favorable accolades from the people who had attended and many of them indicated it was the first time they had ever been in the White House and certainly the first time they had had an adequate briefing by the Administration leadership. The President said that he had received a phone call saying that he should continue this and he was certainly going to do so. He had also been promised that at least in large measure as a result of this briefing he would have a tax bill reported out by Wednesday. The President then said we could do a lot better. He told Rusk and McNamara that they should take a nap in the afternoon prior to these two dinners so they would be much fresher and more alert -- that they had done an A No. 1 job but not quite up to the caliber that they had put on for the labor leaders -- in his mind that performance could not have been better. The President said he had planned for the briefing to be twenty minutes and that instead it had lasted an hour. He said that this was entirely too long and that Mr. McCone alone had spoken for seventeen minutes. He

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
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- 8 -

then said that for the next two dinners he was going to have only two briefers and the briefing would be scheduled for fifteen minutes and that twenty minutes was the absolute maximum he would sit still for. He said he wanted Mr. Rusk and Mr. McNamara to work this out together, with Mr. McNamara covering both the U. S. military and the Soviet military as covered by Mr. McCone, and Rusk covering the Soviet economy and the world roundup as covered by Rusk and McCone at the last hearing. I subsequently checked with Bill Moyer to determine whether this was a change from the President's instructions to Mr. McCone or whether it might have been an oversight. Mr. Moyer stated that the President had given much thought to this and since Mr. McCone would be away, he had changed the system to the one just enumerated. This makes abundant sense to me under the circumstances and I considered any further discussion either with Moyer or the President inappropriate.

8. The meeting then broke up at 4:15 because the President had to go out to dedicate a building.

9. The foregoing notes are in a single copy and will be shown only to the Director upon his return. Any actions indicated will be directed by me at the Monday morning meeting. I will send a very short, sanitized report of this meeting to Mr. McCone by cable.



Marshall S. Carter  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Acting Director

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DRAFT: JAM/mfb 1/16/64

Substitute for paragraph 2:

News media contact for background briefings are to be on a non-attributable basis and are to involve areas of discussion approved by the Director or the Deputy Director after coordination by him with the White House, Department of State, and the Department of Defense, as appropriate. Such briefings must always be conducted on an individual and never on a collective basis and with customary care to avoid disclosures with respect to intelligence information, estimates or administration policy resulting therefrom. Briefings involving attribution should be avoided at all times except under the specific authority of the Director or Deputy Director, such authority to be granted after receipt of policy guidance from the White House.

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16 January 1964

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

1. Attached is a proposed memorandum for you to sign. Copies will then be given to each of the officers who attend the morning meetings. This memo has already been read almost verbatim to the members of the Executive Committee by me and was handled as a directive for their guidance. Its phraseology corresponds to that proposed by you in your draft memorandum of 13 January (attached as Tab A).

2. Discussions with Mr. Bross, Mr. Kirkpatrick, and Mr. Chretien resulted in this final memo. A separate proposal will be made later for the establishment of a guidance committee to study means by which the Agency "image" can best be put forward in accordance with paragraph 5. This committee will have the benefit of the reports called for in paragraph 6. The makeup of this committee has not yet been agreed but my own inclination is to avoid using our senior commanders whose time is already too heavily absorbed by other matters. I would prefer to use some of our more senior officers who do not have immediate operating and command responsibilities and possibly with some assistance from consultants like Frank Wisner.

3. I recommend that you sign the attached memorandum as written.

13/

Marshall S. Carter  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Deputy Director

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16 January 1964

**MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Committee**

**SUBJECT : Agency Relations with News Media**

1. Policy guidance concerning the handling of relations with news media will be issued from time to time by the Director or Deputy Director, and under no circumstances is to be changed or modified except by the Director or Deputy Director in written form, or orally and confirmed by implementing memorandum.

2. News media contacts for background briefings of either attributable or nonattributable nature are to be coordinated by Mr. Chretien with the White House, Department of State, and Department of Defense as appropriate, or other departments and agencies of the Government as may be indicated and approved by the Deputy Director.

3. As a general rule, in the absence of specific instructions and coordination in accordance with paragraph 2 preceding, CIA shall make no releases on any of its estimates, analyses, or reports, whether classified or not. It is considered preferable that such releases be made, if at all, by departments or agencies other than CIA.

4. The substance of personal contacts with individuals of the press, either socially or otherwise, will be recorded in a memorandum for the record as is the Agency's present practice, and a copy forwarded to Mr. Chretien for his information.



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- 2 -

5. It continues to be my desire to create an "image" of CIA which identifies the Agency with its statutory responsibility for assembling, analyzing, and evaluating all intelligence of national significance and reporting the substance of this intelligence to policy makers. This image can be conveyed by emphasizing the Agency's statutory role, as contrasted to its operational activities, in private discussions with our counterparts in Government, with members of Congress and in occasional meetings with influential members of the press or general public. It is not desirable in discussions of this character to refer to operational achievements or substantive production or to make any statements bearing or susceptible to attribution.

6. As recent publicity involving the Agency has probably had a varying impact upon different components, Deputy Directors are requested to submit to the DDCI statements which assess the implications of this publicity for their particular areas with recommendations as to what action they consider appropriate to accomplish the purpose outlined in paragraph 5.

John A. McCone  
Director

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DRAFT:JAM/mcm(13/1/64)  
DRAFT:JABROSS:ag (14/1/64)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Committee

SUBJECT:

~~Agency Relations with News Media~~  
~~Handling of Publicity~~

*relations with news media*

1. Policy guidance concerning the handling of ~~publicity~~

will be issued from time to time by the Director or Deputy Director, and under no circumstances is to be changed or modified except by the Director or Deputy Director in written form, or orally and confirmed by implementing memorandum.

*News media contacts*

2. ~~Press releases~~ for background briefings of either

attributable or ~~un~~<sup>non</sup>attributable nature are to be coordinated by Mr.

Chretien with the White House, Department of State, <sup>and</sup> Department of Defense, <sup>as appropriate, or</sup> ~~any~~ other department or agency of the Government <sup>is</sup>

<sup>may be initiated</sup> as appropriate and approved by the Deputy Director.

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
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TOP SECRET

16 January 1964

Lieutenant General Joseph F. Carroll  
Director  
Defense Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Joe:

25X1 This is the full text of a message received this morning from our Saigon Station quoting a message which [ ] apparently is unable to locate and which may not yet have been transmitted from MACV.

25X1 [ ] asked me to get this to you soonest in order to alert Secretary McNamara since Mr. McCone told me he would discuss the matter with Mr. McNamara as soon as he saw him. This could occur tonight at the White House. I think the subject will also be discussed at USIB tomorrow.

Faithfully yours,

*15/ Pat*

Marshall S. Carter  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Deputy Director

Attachment

Distribution:

Original - Addressee w/att

- 25X1 ✓ 1 - DDCI w/cy att  
1 - DD/P (For C/FE) w/cy att  
1 - DD/S&T [ ] w/cy att  
1 - ER w/cy att

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM: SAIGON

0705Z 16 JAN 64

1. GENERAL HARKINS HAD RECEIVED SIMILAR PROPOSAL FROM GENERAL FITCH, AND REPLIED TO GENERAL FITCH IN MESSAGE IDENTIFIED AS 2 TCO-009-64, PERTINENT PARAGRAPH THAT MESSAGE READS AS FOLLOWS:

"THE MOSAIC MIGHT BE USEFUL IF IT IS UP-TO-DATE, I.E., IT MUST BE BUILT IMMEDIATELY AFTER PHOTOGRAPHY. THIS COUNTRY CHANGES RAPIDLY FROM DRY SEASON TO RAINY SEASON AND THE JUNGLE TAKES OVER IN A MATTER OF DAYS. DUE TO THE LIMITED IN-COUNTRY READOUT CAPABILITY WHICH IS FULLY COMMITTED TO RVNAF TACTICAL SUPPORT, AND THE VOLUME OF COVERAGE INVOLVED IN THIS MOSAIC UNDERTAKING, MACV/2AD PARTICIPATION IN THIS PROJECT WOULD BE RESTRICTED TO COORDINATION. THERE IS CONSIDERABLE IN-COUNTRY COVERAGE OF SVN AVAILABLE THROUGH CURRENT RECONNAISSANCE EFFORT." SAIG STATION CONCURS IN THIS VIEW.

- 2 -

2. AMB LODGE GIVES OFFHAND OPINION THAT HE DOES NOT SEE HOW PROPOSED PHOTO COVERAGE WOULD BE USEFUL IN JUDGING FUTURE PROGRESS OF COUNTERINSURGENCY PROGRAM IN SVN, BUT DOES NOT HOLD STRONG OPINION FOR OR AGAINST PROPOSAL. HE HAS READ GENERAL HARKINS' REPLY QUOTED ABOVE, AND AGREES WITH IT.

END OF MESSAGE

15 January 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director

1. I happened to mention to the Director that while Chief of Staff, NORAD, I had hired a fully qualified public speaking professor for the Headquarters and had required all of my senior staff to take a course in public speaking. This was mandatory, regardless of the officer's current capabilities. The course was conducted for two hours, once a week, and lasted eight weeks, for a total of sixteen hours. Classes were small, of about ten or twelve people, so that toward the end during the two-hour period each of the students could give a ten-minute presentation.

2. The course involved all facets of public speaking, beginning with development of a theme, rough outline, preparation of notes, preparation of a finished talk, reduction to speaking notes, and presentation. The idea was to develop the product you were to sell and then to sell it. The presentation part involved standing on your feet, avoiding inept mannerisms, and all of the various tricks of the trade which a good and convincing speaker must acquire.

3. We already have some very competent briefers and speakers, none of which, however, would suffer by attending a refresher course somewhat along the foregoing lines. We also have our fair share of relatively inadequate briefers and speakers, and at the top level, whose image could be tremendously improved by such a course.

4. The Director thought well of the idea and I would appreciate your views and perhaps, if you think it appropriate,

- 2 -

a consensus obtained by you of whether or not such a project would be of value to the Agency and should be initiated. If affirmative, it must have top-level backing. You might also consider including an abbreviated course in the Midcareer Training Program.

Marshall S. Carter  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Deputy Director

64-24011

4K

15 January 1964

## MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

1. I have looked over the request of the Executive Director for development of an itinerary for his trip to the Far East and have compared it with my own plans. I find no conflict that would in any way be troublesome to anyone and have made changes in my own itinerary, as well as the Executive Director's, to avoid any substantial conflict.

2. I will not visit [redacted]

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3. Mr. Kirkpatrick will not visit [redacted]

or [redacted]

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4. Accordingly, the only duplications are as follows:

a. The [redacted] -- I will be at [redacted] and see no need for meeting with [redacted] who has urged Mr. Kirkpatrick's visit.

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b. Vietnam -- Everybody goes here and we will be at least several weeks apart.

c. [redacted] I will interest myself almost entirely with [redacted] whereas Mr. Kirkpatrick will be meeting with the [redacted] officers at least in part.

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5. Since there will be at least a month's difference in our trips, I can see no problem that should require adjustment in the scheduling.

Marshall S. Carter  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Deputy Director


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
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Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001400010012-5



**SECRET**

10 January 1964



MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, FE Division

VIA : Deputy Director/Plans

SUBJECT : Far East Itinerary

Would you please have drawn up for me an itinerary for a trip to the Far East to commence approximately the first week in February and to return me to Washington by not later than the middle of the last week in February, covering specifically the following countries:

- 25X1 1. The [redacted] [redacted] 25X1
- 25X1 2. [redacted] 25X1
- 25X1 3. [redacted] --if feasible.
4. Vietnam.
- 25X1 5. [redacted] where [redacted] has asked that I meet 25X1  
with a regional conference [redacted] who will be there 25X1  
during the entire first week of February.
- 25X1 6. [redacted] --if possible, and again, if practical.

I would like to spend sufficient time in each country to be able to get a thorough briefing on our activities, to visit the Ambassador and other appropriate Embassy officials in order to ascertain their views of our work and effectiveness, and also to make the appropriate calls on liaison. I believe that FE can best judge as to what is the appropriate length of time to spend in each country.

(signed) Lyman B. Kirkpatrick


Lyman B. Kirkpatrick  
Executive Director

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MEMORANDUM FOR: *DDI*

Attached is  
copy of DCI's "press"  
directive. He has  
revised your para 2  
His substitute para is  
on top.



*OK with DDCI*  
(DATE)


FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101  
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

(CLASSIFICATION)

*DOET*  
*14u*

Handle Via Indicated Controls



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WARNING

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